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Abstract
Raised Afraid: The Media’s Influence in Heightened Fear of Terrorism
By Paige Fetters
Mentored by Dr. Ken Tunnell, School of Justice Studies
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a household topic
and a leading headline for the news media. Following the 9/11 attacks, coverage of the
event was played around the clock for the first five days. 99 – 100% of Americans
followed terrorism-related events by watching television listening to the radio, or
reading print news. Exposure to terrorism-related media have increased substantially
since the widespread use of smartphones and social media, where news and topics can
be shared and discussed around the world in a matter of seconds. The psychological
effects of this exposure could affect how fearful Americans are of terrorism, despite
their relative level of victimization. This thesis will explore the various theories and
hypotheses that have psychoanalyzed the effects terrorism-related media have had on
Americans post-9/11. A convenience sample of 240 college students at a central
Kentucky university yielded results of contradictory opinions regarding the government,
media, and terrorism protection since 9/11. A comparison of this sample’s results to the
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics revealed similar results regarding various
opinions of terrorism. A Pearson correlation was also conducted to examine if any
correlation exists between the number of hours spend consuming news and levels of
fear regarding terrorism.
Keywords and phrases: terrorism, terrorism fear, terrorism media, mass-mediated
terrorism, September 11
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Introduction
“And then, on September 11, the world fractured” (Obama, 2004, Preface to
2004 edition). For many citizens of the United States, it seems as though that fateful day
in 2001 stood still in time. The harrowing sight of two commercial airplanes slamming
into the World Trade Center and then watching America’s greatest symbol of wealth,
power, and international unity plummet to the ground in piles of rubble scarred each
and every American that witnessed it. Ask any person on the street and they will be able
to tell you where they were on that horrifying day. But in all honesty, how could anyone
forget where they watched the planes hit the towers and their subsequent collapse? For
weeks, day in and day out, coverage about September 11 engulfed every news channel,
newspaper, and radio station. While this constant coverage may have seemed beneficial
at the time, how has this affected the United States and our fear of terrorism? Have we
become over-sensitized to terrorism-related topics? The new age of 24-hour news
cycles and social media have caused a heightened fear of terrorism in those who watch,
read, and/or listen to the news.

Defining Terrorism
It is important to preface an underlying issue when conducting a study involving
terrorism: its definition. Although terrorism has existed long before September 11,
2001, the attacks that day jumpstarted the need for major anti-terrorism reform in the
United States and around the world. World leaders in the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) worked feverishly after 9/11 to create new regulations to condemn
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terrorism and even worked to propose a new internationally-accepted definition,
however the UNSC failed to accomplish these tasks because of “profound differences . .
. over the central issues that affect it [terrorism], such as the use of violence, the
responsibility of armed forced in internal conflicts, the right to resist foreign occupation,
or the limits of the exercise of the right to self-determination” (Ruperez, 2006).
With no universally-accepted definition, choosing a definition to use became
challenging. Online searches of articles and government websites led me to the Bureau
of Federal Investigation’s (FBI) Terrorism page, which defines international and domestic
terrorism as listed in the 18 U.S.C. §2331. According to the FBI (2015) website:
“International terrorism”, the focus of my research, means activities that:


Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or
state law;



Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii)
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
or kidnapping; and



Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce,
or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
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“Domestic terrorism” means activities that:


Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;



Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii)
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
or kidnapping; and



Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.

Established Theories
Research on mass-mediated terrorism, regardless of the population studied, has
yielded similar results. Mass-mediated terrorism refers to “acquiring the heightened
attention of the general public, and political elite, and the decision-making circles in the
countries and regions of their choice by politically-motivated deeds perpetrated by
groups of individuals for the sake of communicating messages to a larger audience”
(Nacos, p. 19, 2002). Cultivation Theory, Information Seeking Theory, and Media
Dependency Theory have been especially important in explaining from where
heightened fear of terrorism comes. The studies that highlight the following concepts
have helped researchers, psychologists, and various professionals in understanding the
complex nature of mass-mediated terrorism.
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Cultivation Theory
Lett, DiPietro, and Johnson (2004) conducted their study of Cultivation Theory by
giving college students questionnaires regarding their television usage and their feelings
towards people of Arab cultures. Developed by George Gerbner, the theory “examines
the extent to which cumulative exposure to television contributes to viewers’
conceptions of social reality, in ways that reflect the most stable, repetitive, and
pervasive patterns of images and ideologies that television presents” (Lett, DiPietro, and
Johnson, 2004, p. 40).
Cultivation Theory speculates that prolonged television viewing is more likely to
skew one’s perception of reality toward what they see on television. The aftermath of
the September 11, 2001, attacks set the stage for how Cultivation Theory begins. The
effect of watching airliners crash into buildings and people running for their lives as the
World Trade Center collapsed became especially striking and made people fearful of
attacks to come. The results of Lett, DiPietro, and Johnson’s study (2004) indicated that
students had negative personal emotions and personal relationships with Islamic peers,
but had positive views of Islamic individuals in general. A possible explanation for the
positivity toward Islamic individuals may be the overzealous attempt by television
programs to portray terrorists in a negative light as extremists and separate them from
mainstream Islam.
Nellis and Savage (2012, p. 749) also conducted a research study into Cultivation
Theory, which expanded the research of Lett, DiPietro, and Johnson (2004) by focusing
on one’s perceived risk of terrorism to self and others. Nellis and Savage (2012, p. 749)
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posit “research suggests that although victimization is often associated with fear, people
become afraid disproportionately to their objective risk of victimization because they
are influenced by the information they receive about crime through informal sources,
including the media”. Nellis and Savage used Cultivation Theory to compare fear of
terrorism to fear of crime, which has been studied for decades. However, Nellis and
Savage suggest that the media play a bigger role in fear of terrorism than fear of crime,
stating that “although crime is present within many communities, and individuals have
other sources of local crime information besides the media, terrorism is a very rare
phenomenon that does not occur in most neighborhoods [like crime]. Most Americans
must rely exclusively on the media for terrorism-related information” (2012, pp. 750751).
Nellis and Savage’s research also focused on emphasizing the difference in fear
between those who actually watch and pay attention to the news and those who simply
turn on the news as background noise while doing other things. Their findings suggest
that those who intentionally watch the news for terrorism-related stories are more
fearful and feel more at risk of encountering terrorist activity, suggesting their
motivation for viewing was significantly related to their fear of terrorism (Nellis and
Savage, 2012).
The study conducted by Nellis and Savage (2012) included telephone surveys
with residents of Washington, D.C. and New York City, which were the sites of the 9/11
terrorist attacks. Their results show that people were more afraid of a peer becoming a
victim of terrorism than themselves, however both fearing for others and oneself are
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positively and significantly associated with exposure to television. Their results also
showed that minorities and women were more fearful of terrorism than any other
group. The authors suggest that women may fear more for their children than men;
women may be including their fear for their children in their estimates (Nellis and
Savage, 2012). Overall, this study reinforces what these researchers were suspicious of
in regards to fear of terrorism.

Information Seeking Theory and Media Dependency Theory
Information Seeking Theory and Media Dependency Theory have a very similar
structure; however, Media Dependency is a subsect of Information Seeking Theory. This
theory postulates that “the drive for certainty motivates people to seek out information.
People have an almost innate desire to know things, and when they do not have the
answers they want or need, they are fundamentally compelled to collect information”
(Lachlan, Spence, and Seeger, 2009, p. 102). When uncertainty arises, whether it be a
threat or even a situation where the outcome is completely uncontrollable, this puts
one in an uncomfortable state of ‘what-ifs’ or unwanted anxiety. To reduce this stress or
to calm their nerves, people try to obtain information that would give them a better
grasp on the situation at hand.
Media Dependency Theory is one’s inherent desire to obtain information via
media outlets during times of crisis to help understand the world around them and take
appropriate actions. In this case, the events of September 11, 2001, clearly constitute a
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severe crisis, described as “the worst crisis in modern U.S. history” (Lacklan, Spence, and
Seeger, 2009, p. 102). Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur’s theory states the following:
Audiences depend on mediated information to meet certain needs and achieve
certain goals, but do not depend on all media equally . . . When the most salient
aspects of one’s environment become ambiguous and difficult to understand,
people become especially dependent on mediated information and expert
recommendations in order to restore order to their world . . . During and
following times of crisis, dependencies will not only intensify from an
information-seeking standpoint, but also as they relate to the use of media for
tension release or emotional coping purposes” (Lachlan, Spence, and Seeger,
2009, p. 102) (Lowery, 2004, p. 344).
Since it is apparent that humans are psychologically attuned to depending on the
media for information during times of crisis, what effect does it have after-the-fact?
According to Lachlan, Spence, and Seeger (2009) it may have a negative effect. Results
of their study yielded that respondents indicated higher levels of anger, confusion,
depression, and fear as the amount of media consumption on September 11 increased.
It also states that women reported greater confusion, depression, fear, sorrow, and less
calm (Lachlan, Spence, and Seeger, 2009). According to the authors, “the findings
suggest a potentially dysfunctional pattern of media use in the aftermath of September
11. Similar to other claims that excessive media consumption may lead to overreaction,
the current data suggest that individuals were likely to use media to seek out
information concerning a major crisis or disaster” (2009, pp. 105-106). Even though the
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media are supposed to help keep people informed about crisis situations to reduce
uncertainty, the results of this study indicate that the media create a heightened fear of
terrorism.

The Media’s Role
In her speech to the American Bar Association in July 1985, former British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher declared “publicity is the oxygen of terrorism” (Nacos,
2002, p. 27; Kampf, 2014, p. 2). The media plays a role of utmost importance for both
terrorists and the public: terrorists need the media to broadcast their propaganda to
instill fear in others and the public needs a constant flow of information about the
terrorist event. Television’s instant, live, emotional coverage make it the top news
medium compared to print media. The competitive nature of modern news media
forces corporations to be the first with breaking news and to provide more information,
excitement, and entertainment than their rivals. Hence, news media are “bound to
respond to terrorist propaganda of the deed because it is dramatic bad news” (Nacos,
2002, p. 29).
According to Brigitte Nacos, international terrorists have three universal goals:
“1) To seek attention by spreading fear and anxiety among their target
audiences, which then demonstrates the impotence of a targeted government,
2) To seek recognition of their demands, their grievances, and their causes, and
3) To gain a degree of respectability and legitimacy in their target societies”
(Biernatzki, 2002, p. 9). With these goals in mind, Nacos posits that “the media’s
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reporting of terrorist spectaculars helps to facilitate two of the universal goals of
terrorism. Terrorists gain attention when the volume and placement of news coverage
affects the public agenda” (Biernatzki, 2002 p. 9).
The combination of nearly instant coverage of a terrorist event and the public’s
demand for government officials to resolve the issue has created what Brigitte Nacos
coins as the “CNN Effect”, which is the global news network’s ability to inform the public
instantly and thereby pressure decision makers into quick reactions without granting
them sufficient time for deliberation. The CNN Effect coincides with the “Vietnam
Effect”, which implies that the media caused the loss of the Vietnam War, which was
one of the most televised wars in history. The Vietnam War turned American public
opinion against involvement in military conflicts by dwelling on visual images of the ugly
side of war and there is a growing concern about what kind of war would be started if
American military forces retaliated against a terrorist force (Nacos, 2002, p. 153).
The media and terrorism have a special relationship that Kevin G. Barnhurst has
outlined in two models. The first is the Culpable-Media model, which says that the
media is part of a vicious cycle: “As media discover terrorism, they incite more
terrorism, which produces more media coverage . . . [This also] involves a cycle of
control: If government or the media censor coverage, the controls tend to harm the
credibility of the government and/or the media. The terrorists . . . may resort to even
greater violence” (Barnhurst, 1991, p. 125; Biernatzki, 2002 p. 6-7). Milosevska and
Taneski (2014) offer that the media’s quick coverage of a terrorist organization’s act is a
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key aim for the group which then encourages them to carry out more violent acts (p.
59).
On the other hand, the Vulnerable-Media model sees the media as victims of
terrorism, not as an aide (Milosevska & Taneski, 2014, p. 59). “Any control on coverage,
even a natural one, will be ineffective because terrorists can shift to other forms of
communication by striking vulnerable point in the infrastructure of liberal societies . . .
although the mass media are involved, they present no escape from terrorism”
(Barnhurst, 1991, p. 126; Biernatzki, 2002, p. 7). These two models demonstrate the
double-edged sword that is mass-mediated terrorism’s consequences to the public.
Following the 9/11 attacks, coverage of the attack was played around the clock
for the first five days. Sports and entertainment channels suspended their scheduled
programs and aired only 9/11-related coverage. For the eight weeks following 9/11,
Newsweek and TIME Magazine devoted all cover stories to terrorism. 99 – 100% of all
Americans followed initial news of the terrorist attacks by listening to radio broadcasts
and watching television, viewing the broadcasted images of planes hitting the towers
hundreds of times (Snow, 2007, p. 19): “ . . . television networks and stations replayed
the scenes of horror again and again, revisiting the suffering or people over and over,
searching for emotions beyond the boundaries of good taste” (Nacos, 2002, p. 54).
Others read first-hand accounts that detailed the horror and chaos from people
who were near the Twin Towers that day. John Bussey, a journalist at The Wall Street
Journal, was one of those people. The opening paragraphs to his article, published
September 12, 2001, wrote:
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If there’s only one sight I’ll remember from the destruction of the World Trade
Center, it is the flight of desperation – the headlong leap from the top-most
floors by those who chose a different death than the choking smoke and flame.
Some fell swinging their arms and legs, looking down as the street came up at
them. Others fell on their backs, peering upward toward the flames and sky.
They dropped like deadweight, several seconds, hopeless and unhelpable.
Always the same end. Some crashed into the Plexiglas awning over the entrance
to the North Tower. Others hit a retaining wall. Still others landed on lampposts
and shrubbery. After the 80-floor drop, the impact left small puffs of pink and
red drifting at ground level. Firefighters arriving on the scene ran for cover.
(Bussey, 2001)
Such a captivating, yet bone-chilling description to read about the way hundreds
of people died on September 11, 2001. Nacos refers to these detailed accounts provided
by the media as being of our modern “show and tell” culture, which she says
“desensitizes the public and causes confusion between the public and private sphere”
(Nacos, 2002, p. 53). Is it morally disturbing that a journalist meticulously described the
suicide of those facing an imminent death? Or what about the media producers that
allowed for recorded exchanges between first responders and victims stuck in the World
Trade Center on 9/11 to be aired on national television for all to hear their final words?
Nacos (2002) describes the media as creating a collective sadness in which for everyone
to participate, but it has caused an outrage in the public eye that the area between
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public and private has become grayed because, in the eye of journalists, “nothing is ever
too private to be talked about” (Nacos, 2002, p. 53).
With this prolonged exposure to such harrowing images from 9/11 due to the
media, how has it affected the way people react emotionally to other terrorism-related
themes? Aaron Hoffman, Christopher Kowal, and Jose Kaire de Francisco of Purdue
University detailed two hypotheses that may explain how people react when they see
new terrorism-related events. The first is the fear inflation hypothesis:
The fear inflation hypothesis suggests that frequent exposure to depictions of
terrorism in the mass media causes more intense emotional reactions in
consumers than infrequent exposure to the material. People who are exposed to
several mass media depictions of terrorism should report higher levels of anxiety
than people who only see a single media depiction of terrorism. People who are
exposed to several mass media depictions of terrorism are also likely to display
related emotions, like anger, more intensely than those who are exposed to a
single depiction of terrorism in the mass media. (Hoffman, Kowal, & de
Francisco, 2010, p. 4)
The second is the fear deflation hypothesis:
In contrast, this hypothesis suggests that frequent exposure to depictions of
terrorism in the mass media moderates the intensity of the emotional reactions
consumers experience relative to those whose exposure to these depictions
infrequent. It implies that people who are exposed to several mass media
depictions of terrorism will report lower levels of anxiety than people who only
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see a single media depiction of terrorism. People who are exposed to several
mass media depictions of terrorism are also likely to display related emotions,
like anger, less intensely than those are exposed to a single depiction of
terrorism in the mass media. (Hoffman, Kowal, & de Francisco, 2010, p. 4)
These hypotheses parallel research by child psychologists that suggest playing violent
video games can desensitize or hyper-sensitize children due to their aggressive and
gruesome nature (Ferguson, Garza, Jerabeck, Ramos, & Galindo, 2013, p. 110). Exposing
children to terrorism media can have a similar effect. According to Becker-Blease,
Finkelhor, and Turner (2008), younger children react to more frightening visual images,
including fantasy images, which can create “trauma networks” in their long-term
memory more easily than adults (Houston, 2009, p. 853). By displaying these harrowing
images to children, they become more pre-disposed to feeling fearful of fantasy and
reality concepts throughout their childhood and into their adult life (pp. 229-230).
These images can also result in effects such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) in children and adults, especially for individuals that rely heavily on the media for
information. While many people assume that PTSD can only occur in those who have
first-hand experience of a traumatic event, people who are more geographically distant
from the area of an attack must watch media coverage for more information about
what happened. This heavy exposure to terrorism media may then cause post-traumatic
stress or even PTSD in some cases (Houston, 2009, p. 846).
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Tweeting Terrorism
Social media has become a staple of the 21st Century and media usage itself is a
relatively new phenomenon that jihadist groups have started to use in the last 20 years.
According to the U.S. State Department, less than half of the designated “foreign
terrorist” organizations maintained a website in 1998; by the end of 1999, nearly every
terrorist organization had at least one website or some established presence online and
there were over 5,300 active terrorist websites in 2006. These websites were used for
two reasons: First, they would use them to express their hate and violence with other
terror groups and their supporters to launch a “psychological warfare” against their
enemies. Secondly, they would use them for attacking and hacking computer networks,
software, and the Internet—a new phenomenon now referred to as cyberterrorism. As
the need for mobility amongst these jihadist groups grew, members expanded their
verbal rhetoric to other platforms (Weimann, 2008, pp. 74-75).
Social media sites such as Twitter, Instagram, and various text-messaging apps
are utilized by thousands of Islamic jihadists daily to detail their lives on the front lines
of an international war. According to Kurt Eichenwald (2015, p. 2), social media is a vital
tool for any terrorist cell; it is how they recruit new members, keep track of other
members, get money from sympathizers, and document any terrorist activity from the
Middle East for the world to see. Advanced technology also makes terror cells virtually
mobile so that they are not confined to any one geographical location where they can
be found (Weimann, 2008, p. 78). According to Jytte Klausen (2014, p. 4), “social media
has changed the dynamic fundamentally. It has eliminated the terrorists’ dependency
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on mainstream media, reversing the relationship by making mainstream media
dependent on the jihadist-run social media”.
Terrorist activity on social media is a very meticulous and thoughtfully planned
occurrence. Each tweet, message, and shared post is meant to attract people to the
lifestyle of a “radicalized fighter” (O’Briain, 2015, p. 2). For those that follow Islamic
terrorist organizations on social media, whether out of fearful curiosity or an interested
fan, watching videos or opening links shared by the organization and/or its members
increases the exposure of said group to the masses and helps recruit new members.
The Islamic terrorist cell ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), also known as ISIL
(Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), is especially careful about what kind of
propaganda its members share on their social media pages when it comes to recruiting
new members. Unlike other terrorist groups, ISIS does not settle for any person that
wants to join their ranks, especially those that are disillusioned or easily swayed because
these type of people tend to back out at the last minute of traveling abroad to fight with
them. Instead, ISIS tends to recruit members that are more ambitious, educated, and
settled. ISIS is viewed by some on social media “as a group with a role and purpose for
everyone, from builder to doctor, locksmith to engineer” (O’Briain, 2015, p. 2).
ISIS also uses social media to show the world that they go through their daily
lives just like everyone else. Not only does ISIS share pictures and videos of its members
beheading innocent victims and merciless executions, but ISIS members have shared
pictures of themselves eating Snickers bars (Farwell, 2015, p. 50), holding a jar of Nutella
found in a convenience store (Klausen, 2014, p. 12), and a packed power strip charging
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half a dozen smartphones used by ISIS members (Klausen, 2014, p. 5). Members share
these pictures to attract new recruits, showing them that life as a jihadist is not much
different than the life they are used to living. One member, a British foreign fighter with
ISIS named Abu Sumayyah Al-Britani, made it seem like living in a war-torn city was
more desirable than living comfortably in a family home: “It’s actually quite fun. It’s
really really fun. It’s better than that game Call of Duty. It’s like that but it’s in 3D where
everything is happening in front of you” (Klausen, 2014, p. 4).
While there are numerous benefits for terrorist groups that use social media as a
platform, it also has its drawbacks. ISIS gained the world’s attention by sharing videos of
its members beheading men and other atrocities, but while members may take pride in
sharing and bragging these experiences to followers, it can be used as opposition by
their enemies. These types of horrors can be used to discredit the militants’ supposed
purpose, which was illustrated by the U.S. State Department in a video mocking ISIS
recruitment efforts and displaying the graphic, ugly brutality of the group (Farwell,
2015). Internet communications can also cause feuding between Islamic groups. For
example, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, a branch of al-Qaeda operating in Syria, have been
fighting with each other over the same media platforms used to get new recruits.
According to Kurt Eichenwald (2015, p. 3), “Islamic terror groups are not some giant,
unified entity – they are split by egos, arrogance, self-righteousness and a lust for
power, just like any other collection of ideological organizations”.
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Research Methods
A survey with a series of terrorism-related questions using Likert scales was
given to students in selected classes within the five academic colleges at Eastern
Kentucky University: College of Justice and Safety; College of Health Sciences; College of
Education; College of Arts and Sciences; and College of Business and Technology, on
September 3rd, September 9th, and September 15th, 2015. 240 students in these classes
gave consent to participate in the survey. The survey had the United States’ Code of
Federal Regulations definition of terrorism at the top of the page where the survey
questions began. For the purpose of this survey, the “definition” of terrorism was broad
as to not limit any participants’ thinking about what could constitute terrorism.
A sample from the undergraduate population of Eastern Kentucky University
(EKU) was chosen because of the unique experiences of the student body. EKU’s service
region encapsulates Kentucky’s Appalachian area, which contains one of the poorest
regions in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Many students from this region
attend EKU due to the university’s satellite campuses throughout this district and EKU’s
low tuition rates when compared to rates at other public universities in the state.
However, there are also urban areas located in Kentucky, such as Lexington and
Louisville, from where many students hail. The combination of many low-income, ruralarea students with many higher-income, urban-area students creates a unique
population to study.
Students who were asked to participate in the survey were enrolled in courses
that were selected using EKU’s online course scheduling system within EKUDirect, a
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portal used by students to access their personal information. This course scheduling
system can be used to look up when courses meet (time and days of the week), the
building they are held in, and the number of students enrolled in that course. By using
previously-held knowledge about which classes are designated to a specific academic
college, I looked up classes that I thought would have a wide-range of student
backgrounds and ages. Since my survey had a specific age-range, I avoided 400-level
(upperclassmen) courses as best as I could to limit the number of non-traditional
students, typically students over the age of 23, whom would not be able to participate
in the survey.
Three-hundred student surveys were printed out that were to be divided up
equally amongst the five academic colleges, which allotted 60 surveys per college. As I
began my search for classes, I looked for courses that had 25 to 30 students or courses
that neared 60 students that were held on Thursday afternoons or at any time on
Wednesdays. These specific time slots fit my class and work schedule and also gave me
the chance to survey students regardless of Tuesday-Thursday or Monday-WednesdayFriday class schedules.
As I found classes that fit my time slot and believed I would have a majority of
students within the 18-23-year-old age range, I emailed the professor of record and
asked if I could have their permission to survey their students. I explained the purpose
of my survey and attached a copy of my survey so the professor could examine it and
make a decision. In total, I emailed nine professors and got a response and approval
from eight, with one professor never responding. As I was given their approval, the
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professors and I scheduled a day to come to their class during their assigned course
meeting to distribute my surveys.
When I arrived at these classes, I talked to the students about my survey and
went through the survey process to make sure they understood what was expected of
them if they were to participate in the survey. I explained that the survey was voluntary
and that they were not receiving any sort of incentive for completing the survey. After
speaking with the students, I passed out surveys to each student for them to complete
and I left the room while students participated in the survey. After the surveys were
completed, I would collect them then thank the students and their professor for their
time.
IBM SPSS was used to input and analyze the data from the student surveys. Due
to this type of data being ordinal and/or categorical data, each answer was coded so
that I could use descriptive statistics to find the mode and mean for the survey
questions. Pearson correlation tests were used and descriptions of that process appear
later in this paper.

Sample Demographics
Demographic self-reported data appear in Table 1. The mean age of participants
in the survey was 18.31 years old. Nearly one-half (N=117; 48.8 percent) of participants
were this age. 45 participants (18.8 percent) indicated they were 19 years old, 31 (12.9
percent) indicated they were 20 years old, 25 (10.4 percent) indicated they were 21
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years old, 10 (4.2 percent) indicated they were 22 years old, and the remaining three
participants (1.3 percent) indicated they were 23 years old.
For gender, 150 students (62.5 percent) indicated they were female, 80 said they
were male (33.3 percent), and 10 (4.2 percent) were unknown or preferred not to
specify their gender. An overwhelming majority of participants (76.3 percent; N=183)
indicated they were natives of Kentucky while 48 participants (20 percent) were out-ofstate students, and the remaining 9 students (3.8 percent) were unknown.
For religious beliefs, more than ¾ of participants (N=181; 75.4 percent) indicated
they were Christian, 18 participants (7.5 percent) said they were Agnostic, 8 participants
(3.3 percent) identified as Atheist, 1 student (0.4 percent) identified as Muslim, 9
students (3.8 percent) said they had an “other” religion (most of these students
specified they were Catholic), and the remaining 23 students (9.6 percent) were
unknown or preferred not to specify.
Political affiliation had more varied results. 109 students (45.4 percent)
identified as Republican/Conservative, 53 students (22.1 percent) identified with being a
Democrat/Liberal, 41 students (17.1 percent) identified as being an Independent, 3
students (1.3 percent) identified as being an “other” party, and the remaining 34
students (14.2 percent) were either unknown or preferred not to specify.
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Table 1: Sample Demographics
Self-Reported Data
Age
18
19
20
21
22
23
Unknown
Total
Gender
Male
Female
Unknown
Total
Political affiliation Republican/Conservative
Democrat/Liberal
Independent
Other
Prefer not to specify
Unknown
Total
Religious belief
Christian
Muslim
Agnostic
Atheist
Other
Prefer not to specify
Unknown
Total
Kentucky native
Yes
No
Unknown
Total

Frequency
117
45
31
25
10
2
9
240
80
150
10
240
109
53
41
3
25
9
240
181
1
18
8
9
14
9
240
183
48
9
240

Percent
48.8
18.8
12.9
10.4
4.2
1.3
3.8
100.0
33.3
62.5
4.2
100.0
45.4
22.1
17.1
1.3
10.4
3.8
100.0
75.4
0.4
7.5
3.3
3.8
5.8
3.8
100.0
76.3
20.0
3.8
100.0

Results
Results showed that over half of the sample population (50.4 percent) rely on
the Internet/social media as their preferred source of news. The specific sites and phone
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applications used varied greatly among participants, but many people used Facebook,
Twitter, and apps for CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC as their main news sources. The
amount of time spent consuming news also varied greatly, with the same amount of
students indicating they consumed between 0-2 hours (37.1 percent) of news and 3-5
hours (37.1 percent) of news each week. Only 22.4 percent of students said they
consumed more than six hours of news each week. It is known how much of this time
spent consuming news is terrorism-related. Table 2 below displays more detailed
information on news consumption by survey participants.

Table 2: Hours of news consumption by survey participants
Frequency
Percent
0 – 2 hours
89
37.1
3 – 5 hours
89
37.1
More than 6 hours
54
22.4
Does not consume news
5
2.1
Unknown
3
1.3
Total
240
100.0

When asked how much they fear about becoming a victim of terrorism, 70.8
percent (N=170) said that they were not worried. The remaining 29.2 percent (N=70)
said they were worried about becoming a victim of terrorism. 58.3 percent (N=140) of
participants said that they were not worried about a friend or family member becoming
a victim of terrorism. The remaining 41.7 percent (N=100) of students indicated they
were worried. This indicates that this sample is more fearful of their friends and family
becoming a terrorism victim than they are becoming a victim themselves. Table 3 below
displays this information.
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These results could be an indication of Cultivation Theory, which was mentioned
previously as being studied by Nellis and Savage for disproportionate levels of
victimization fears for oneself and for peers by receiving information from informal
sources, such as the media (2012). In their study, Nellis and Savage ranked fear of
terrorism victimization on a scale from 1 (not worried at all) to 10 (extremely worried).
The mean score for fear of a family member was 4.48 and the mean for fear for oneself
was 3.82 (Nellis and Savage, 2012). The respondents in Nellis and Savage’s study, similar
to this sample in my study, reported greater fear of family members becoming terrorism
victims than for themselves becoming terrorism victims.

Table 3: Comparison of participants’ fear of becoming terrorism victim and
friend/family becoming terrorism victim
Participant becoming
Participant’s friend/family member
terrorism victim
becoming terrorism victim
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Worried
70
29.2
100
41.7
Not worried
170
70.8
140
58.3
Total
240
100.0
240
100.0

An explanation for this reasoning being, as previously mentioned, most (48.8
percent) of the participants of this survey were 18 years old. For many students at age
18, presumably a freshman in college, it is their first time living away from home and,
for some students, they are away at school in a university outside of their home state,
away from the psychological and emotional support of their families. These students
may fear that something tragic will happen to their friends and family at home while
they are away at school, including terrorism. Another factor that could affect this

25

statistic is that 62.5 percent of the participants are female. A posteriori knowledge
denotes that women are more empathetic and emotionally driven than their male
counterparts, so answers by female participants may have more emotional reasoning
than male answers when asked about friends and family becoming victims of terrorism.
Feelings about another terrorist attack in the United States and fear that ISIS/ISIL
will be behind the attack yielded similar results. 65.8 percent (N=158) of this sample
indicated they were worried a terrorist attack will happen to the United States within
the next year. The remaining 34.2 percent (N=82) indicated they were not worried. 62.5
percent (N=150) indicated they were worried that ISIS/ISIL will attack the United States
within the next year, while the remaining 37.5 percent (N=90) indicated they were not
worried. Table 4 below shows the comparison of the two questions and the answer
frequency and percentages.

Table 4: Comparison of terrorist attack fear and ISIS/ISIL fear
Fear of terrorist attack to the Fear of ISIS/ISIL attacking
U.S. in the next year
the U.S. in the next year
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Worried
158
65.8
150
62.5
Not worried
82
34.2
90
37.5
Total
240
100.0
240
100.0

These questions may have yielded similar results because media coverage about
ISIS/ISIL is very prominent right now. ISIS/ISIL is the most broadcasted extremist group
at the moment and this sample may have assumed that ISIS/ISIL will be behind the next
terrorist attack in the United States if there is one. Radicalized groups such as Al-Qaeda
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and Hezbollah are not given nearly as much attention as ISIS/ISIL in the media currently
so the media may have shaped some preconceived notions about who will claim
responsibility for the next terrorist attack on the United States.
An interesting aspect to the results of this sample’s survey is the question about
preventative measures. Following the two previous questions about terrorism attacks in
the United States, participants were asked if they had taken any preventative measures
due to their fear of becoming a victim of terrorism, such as not traveling by airplane,
avoiding large metropolitan areas, and avoiding visiting a high-populated tourist area.
An overwhelming 69.2 percent (N=166) indicated they had not taken any preventative
measures. The next most-frequently chosen answer was “avoided traveling by airplane,”
which was only selected by 22 participants (9.2 percent). The six preventative measures
listed in the survey had a combined total of N=74, which is only 30.8 percent of the
participants.
Even though this sample indicated that they are fearful of another terrorist
attack in the United States within the next year, they are not acting on their level of
fear. These answers, however, are nearly parallel with the answers of the previous
survey question about this sample’s fear of becoming a victim of terrorism. Table 5
below displays the frequencies of each answer listed in the survey.
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Table 5: Preventative measures taken due to fear of being a terrorism victim
Frequency
Percent
Avoided traveling by plane
22
9.2
Avoided visiting/living in a large
18
7.5
metropolitan area
Avoided attending large sporting events
4
1.7
Denied a job offer based on type of
1
0.4
work or location of job
Avoided visiting a high-populated
19
7.9
tourist attraction/area
Changed travel plans
10
4.2
None
166
69.2
Total
240
100.0

When asked what characteristics of terrorism were most fearful to the
participants, the majority of this sample (64.2 percent; N=154) indicated that the
unknown of when or where an attack will happen was the most worrisome. The next
most-frequently selected answer was that participants were fearful of a friend or family
member becoming a victim (16.3 percent; N=39). The fear of oneself becoming a victim
of terrorism from this sample was only indicated in 5 percent (N=12) of the answers,
which would rank this characteristic fourth on the list of fears provided to participants.
This sample demonstrates, as previously mentioned, their fear of losing loved ones
tragically to terrorism if, for the sake of this sample, they are away from home attending
college. Table 6 is displayed below with an itemized list of frequencies and percentages
for each answer.
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Table 6: Characteristics of terrorism that are most fearful
Frequency
Number of casualties
22
Unknown on when/where an attack will happen
154
Fear of becoming a victim
12
Fear of friend/family member becoming a victim
39
Other
10
Unknown
3
Total
240

Percent
9.2
64.2
5.0
16.3
4.2
1.3
100.0

The most surprising results are from the next four questions on the survey that
asked about confidence and trust in the government and the news media. Participants
were asked if they were confident that the United States government is providing
effective terrorism information. Over two-thirds of this sample (69.6 percent; N=167)
were had confidence in the government’s terrorism information, while 30 percent
(N=72) did not have confidence. However, when asked if they trusted that the
government is being open about potential terror threats, nearly two-thirds of this
sample did not have trust that the government was being open, while the remaining
one-third (35.5 percent; N=85) did have trust. A comparison table for these results is
displayed below in Table 7.

Table 7: Comparison of participants’ trust and confidence regarding terrorism
threats and protection
Confidence the government is Trust the government is being
providing effective terrorism
open about potential terror
protection
threats
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Agree
167
69.6
85
35.5
Disagree
72
30.0
153
63.7
Unknown
1
0.4
2
0.8
Total
240
100.0
240
100.0
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As the results show, the statistics for these two questions are contradictory of
each other. One would expect that if someone were confident that the government
were providing effective terrorism protection that they would also agree that the
government was being open about their potential terror threats from which they are
protecting the public. This could question if this sample is assuming there is effective
terrorism protection because they had not seen or heard anything that would make
them think otherwise. This sample may also have assumptions that broadcasting
potential terror threats could cause widespread panic and it may also put people in
danger by revealing information too early without more investigation by the proper
authorities.
Another interesting twist to this sample’s results was when survey participants
were asked if they thought the government was doing well to reduce the threat of
terrorism, which is displayed in Table 8 below. A little more than half of the participants
(55.4 percent; N=133) agreed that the government was reducing the threat of terrorism
and the remaining 44.2 percent (N=106) disagreed. This is slightly contradictory to the
previous question about this sample’s confidence that the government is providing
effective terrorism protection, in which nearly 70 percent said they were confident. So
while over two-thirds of the participants agree that the government is providing
effective terrorism protection, this sample is split nearly down the middle regarding the
government’s overall performance in reducing the threat of terrorism to the United
States.
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Table 8: Comparison of government’s confidence and performance of terrorism
protection
Confidence the government is providing Government is doing well to reduce
effective terrorism protection
terrorism threat
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Agree
167
69.6
133
55.4
Disagree
72
30.0
106
44.2
Unknown
1
0.4
1
0.4
Total
240
100.0
240
100.0

In my knowledgeable opinion, the most interesting finding from this sample’s
survey was their opinion on the media’s responsibility of relaying terrorism information
to the public. When asked if they trusted that the news media is providing credible
terrorism information, the majority of this sample (60.4 percent; N=145) indicated they
disagreed, while the remaining participants (39.2 percent; N=94) indicated they agreed
with the statement. This indicates another discrepancy in how this sample answered the
survey questions. Even though the majority of this sample believes that the U.S.
government is providing effective terrorism protection and that the U.S. government is
doing well to reduce the terrorism threat, they also believe that the government is NOT
being open about potential terrorist threats and that the news media is providing
credible terrorism information. However, there is consistency when comparing the
government’s openness about terrorist threats and the news media providing credible
information as is displayed in the Table 9 below.
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Table 9: Comparison of feelings towards the government’s openness about terror
threats and the news media providing credible terrorism information
Trust that the government is
Trust that the news media is
being open about potential
providing credible terrorism
terror threats
information
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Agree
85
35.5
94
39.2
Disagree
153
63.7
145
60.4
Unknown
2
0.8
1
0.4
Total
240
100.0
240
100.0

As mentioned previously, the majority of this sample agree that the government
is not being open about terror threats and the news media is not providing credible
terrorism-related information. This begs the question of who or what do we blame for
this pattern of mistrust? The process of public information is calculated with precision
and is controlled for the purpose of ensuring that the right information is given at the
right time. Since we rely so heavily on the media to deliver credible news effectively and
efficiently, this also means that we are exposed to regulated bias from media
conglomerates.
This regulation, or lack thereof, is evident in television media. Each television
channel is owned by one of a handful of massive media conglomerations that are
controlled by just a few individuals after the media was deregulated following the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Daws, 2009). These individuals have the power to
control what is broadcast on stations and channels under their ownership. This power
also extends to local and national news channels and can lead to bias in the information
reporters and broadcasters are telling the public. In an investigation to find out if
professional journalists were neutral or not, authors K. McCarthy and W. Dolsfma
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suggest that “(1) the media help set the public agenda, by promoting certain events and
causes, for better or for worse; (2) the media influence the public’s perception of risk,
by disproportionately sensationalizing risk and by emphasizing probable negative
consequences over probable positive ones” and their results demonstrate “conclusively
that the media are not neutral: the media alter the public’s perception of reality” (2014,
Abstract).
As we can see from the results of the survey, participants are aware of the media
bias in news reporting and it can be conclusively said that this sample does not have
trust that the government is being open about potential terror threats, which is further
aggravated by not trusting that the news media is providing credible terrorism
information.

Pearson Correlation
A Pearson Correlation test was performed on two variables and compared to a
third to find any statistical significance between the two sets of variables. Pearson
correlations measure two variables on a scale from -1 to +1, -1 being a total negative
correlation, 0 being no correlation, and +1 being a total positive correlation. “Fear of
becoming a victim of terrorism” and “Fear of Friend/Family becoming a terrorism victim”
were both compared to “Hours of news consumption” to determine if there were any
correlations between the variables.
A Pearson correlation test determined that there is a -.137 (p=.034) correlation
between “Hours of news consumption” and “Fear of becoming a victim of terrorism” that
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is significant at the 0.05 level. A Pearson test also determined that there is a -.166 (p=.010)
correlation between “Hours of news consumption” and “Fear of Friend/Family becoming
terrorism victim” that is significant at the 0.05 level. Even though these are both relatively
weak negative correlations, these results demonstrate the application of a couple of
theories and hypotheses that were previously mentioned.
These results could be an indicator of the fear deflation hypothesis, which posits
that those who are exposed to more frequent depictions of mass-mediated terrorism will
report lower levels of anxiety than those who only see a single depiction of massmediated terrorism ((Hoffman, Kowal, & de Francisco, 2010). The negative correlation in
these results indicate that as one variable increases (hours of news consumption), the
other decreases (levels of fear), meaning that the increased exposure to terrorism-related
media could have helped lower the levels of fear for this sample. Tables 10 and 11
displaying these correlations are below.

Table 10: Pearson Correlation of hours of news consumption and fear of becoming a
victim of terrorism
Hours of news Fear of becoming a
consumption
victim of terrorism
Hours of news
Pearson
1
-.137
consumption
Correlation
.034
Sig. (2-tailed)
240
240
N
Fear of becoming a
Pearson
-.137
1
victim of terrorism
Correlation
.034
Sig. (2-tailed)
240
240
N
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Table 11: Pearson Correlation of hours of news consumption and fear of friend/family
becoming terrorism victim
Hours of news
Fear of
consumption
friend/family
becoming terrorism
victim
Hours of news
Pearson Correlation
1
-.166
consumption
Sig. (2-tailed)
.010
N
240
240
Fear of friend/family
Pearson Correlation
-.166
1
becoming terrorism
Sig. (2-tailed)
.010
victim
N
240
240

Comparison to Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
A few of the questions used in the survey were pulled from telephone surveys
that the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (SCJS) conducted between 2009 and
2013 of adults 18 years of age or older. The difference between the sample in my survey
and the sample in the SCJS survey is that my sample is a non-probability convenience
sample that was found based on their accessibility and proximity to me as a researcher.
On the other hand, SCJS’s sample was found using simple random sampling which is a
probability sampling method. Since they are two different sampling methods, I cannot
compare them for the purpose of coming to conclusions about the population the
samples from which they were derived. However, they can be compared for similarities
and any parallel characteristics. The SCJS questions were asked multiple times over a
decade or more so I will only be comparing the results of the latest date the survey
conducted with my survey questions. Wording of the questions or answers may be
altered slightly to similar words for the purpose of clarity in the comparison of the two
surveys.
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The first question asked if respondents thought it would be necessary to give up
some civil liberties to curb terrorism in the United States. In March and April 2009, 27
percent (N=403) of SCJS respondents agreed that they would have to give up some civil
liberties while 65 percent (N=970) disagreed. 8 percent (N=119) refused or did not
know. My sample was slightly different than SCJS. 42.5 percent (N=102) of my sample
agreed that giving up civil liberties was necessary, while 56.7 percent (N=136) did not
agree. However, majority of both samples agree that giving up civil liberties was not
necessary to reduce terrorism. Table 12 displays these results.

Table 12: Comparison of SCJS survey and this sample regarding civil liberties: “It will
be necessary to give up civil liberties to reduce terrorism.”
SCJS
This sample
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Agree
403
27.0
102
42.5
Disagree
970
65.0
136
56.7
Unknown/refused
119
8.0
2
5.8
Total
1492
100.0
240
100.0

The next question asked how respondents felt the U.S. government was doing in
reducing the threat of terrorism. For this comparison, I have kept the original format of
each question for the sake of clarity because altering them may have been confused
their integrity. In August 2011, 76 percent (N=1147) of SCJS respondents answered that
the government was doing well while 22 percent (N=332) answered that they thought
that government was not doing well. My sample, however, were not as optimistic.
When asked if they thought that the government was doing well to reduce the threat of
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terrorism, 55.4 percent (N=133) answered that they agreed, while 44.2 percent (106)
disagreed. The results for these questions is displayed on the next page in Table 13.

Table 13: Comparison of SCJS and this sample based on government’s ability to reduce
terrorism threat
SCJS: “How well do you think
This sample: “The U.S.
the U.S. government is doing in
government is doing well to
reducing the threat of
reduce the threat of terrorism,
terrorism?”
agree or disagree?”
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Well/Agree
1147
76.0
133
55.4
No/Disagree
332
22.0
106
44.2
Unknown
30
2.0
1
0.4
Total
1509
100.0
240
100.0

The third question for comparison asked respondents their confidence that the
U.S. government is providing effective terrorism protection for its citizens. In April 2013,
70 percent (N=716) of SCJS respondents answered that they had confidence, while the
remaining 30 percent (N=307) answered that they had no confidence. My sample was
nearly parallel with the answers of SCJS respondents. 69.6 percent (N=167) of my
sample had confidence of effective terrorism protection, while 30 percent (N=72) did
not have confidence. The comparison of this question is displayed below in Table 14.

Table 14: Comparison of SCJS and this sample in regards to the government providing
effective terrorism protection
SCJS
This sample
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Confidence
716
70.0
167
69.6
No confidence
307
30.0
72
30.0
Unknown
0
0.0
1
0.4
Total
1023
100.0
240
100.0
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The last question for comparison is a little different than the first three. SCJS
asked their respondents: “How worried are you that you or someone in your family will
become a victim of terrorism?” For my survey, I divided this question into two separate
questions, asking my sample how worried they are about themselves becoming a victim
of terrorism and then how worried they are that a friend or family member will become
a victim of terrorism. For the purpose of comparison, I have computed the
mathematical average for the answers of these two questions in my survey so that they
can be parallel to the question in the SCJS survey.
In April 2013, 40 percent (N=409) answered that they were worried that they or
a friend/family member would become a victim of terrorism, while the remaining 60
percent (N=614) indicated that they were not worried. My sample, however, were more
worrisome than SCJS respondents. 64.6 percent (N=155) answered they were worried
that they or a friend/family member would become a terrorism victim, while the
remaining 35.4 percent (N=85) were not worried. Table 15 below displays this
information.

Table 15: Comparison of SCJS and this sample regarding fear of oneself or
friend/family member becoming terrorism victim
SCJS
This sample
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Worried
409
40.0
155
64.6
Not worried
614
60.0
85
35.4
Total
1023
100.0
240
100.0
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Conclusion
In conclusion, I have explored some of the various theories and hypotheses that
are established for mass-mediated terrorism and the findings researchers have
discovered through their studies. There were discrepancies in this sample’s attitudes
towards how the media and government inform the public of terrorism threats and
events which demonstrated contradictory feelings from what would be expected. This
sample demonstrated higher levels of fear for their friends/family becoming victims of
terrorism compared to themselves becoming terrorism victims, which could be an
indication of Cultivation theory. A Pearson correlation test also demonstrated a weak
negative correlation between the number of hours this sample consumed news media
and their levels of fear for themselves and friends/family becoming victims of terrorism.
This negative correlation could be an indication of the fear deflation hypothesis, which
posits that increased exposure to terrorism media contributes to lower levels of anxiety
regarding terrorism.
Despite the addition that my research contributes to in the exploration of massmediated terrorism, more research still needs to be completed due to my shortcomings.
First, since my sample was chosen because of convenience sampling, I am unable to
compare it to other samples that were chosen through simple random sampling as an
indicator of how this sample feels as compared to others surveyed in their age group.
This means that I cannot take this sample and compare their answers to other surveyed
persons between the ages of 18 and 23 to see how this sample is similar or different to
the other samples.
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However, convenience sampling was the only feasible way I was going to get
responses to this survey with college students as my sample population. With the help
of my mentor to bounce ideas off each other, I considered many options before
choosing to do the convenience sampling, such as standing at the heavily-studentpopulated Powell Student Center or having a mass e-mail containing the survey sent to
400 members of the EKU Honors Program, where I am a student as well and is the
purpose behind my research. I ultimately decided that the convenience sampling was
the best decision, despite it hindering some analyses I could perform.
Another limitation of this study was my survey. When I was creating my survey, I
looked at the types of questions other published research with surveys used and I based
most of my questions off the types of questions those surveys asked. Through no one’s
fault but my own, I did not realize that my survey lacked the type of questions it should
regarding media and terrorism until after all 300 three-page surveys were printed,
courtesy of the Honors Program. I did not want to waste 900 pieces of paper by
throwing out the surveys and creating new ones to be used, so I had to make do with
what I had and hoped the results would be useable with all of the research I had
completed already. My mentor helped me analyze the results by comparing the answers
of some questions and discovering there were discrepancies in this sample’s feelings.
My last shortcoming was an overarching theme that can be found in my previous
two limitations: lack of time and money. With only 10 months to complete this paper
and lack of money to be able to spend on this project, I was very limited in the resources
I could use. As a college student, I had to complete this project on top of balancing
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upper-level courses, a part-time job, and a social life. The Honors Program took a huge
burden off of me by printing the surveys free of charge and I did not have any other
available funds to use on other, more expensive ways to conduct my research. Despite
these issues, I feel that my research contributes a great deal to informing others of the
unknown knowledge regarding mass-mediated terrorism and how it affects our society
today.
The overall theme to take away from my research is that despite what the media
tells us, terrorism does not happen that often. In fact, in his study researching terrorism
fear and mental health, Ian Palmer (2007, p. 290) posits that “the risk of dying from one
[acts of terror] has been put at somewhere between dying after a bee sting and
lightning strike”. The media has frightened us into thinking that we have a big red target
on our heads, when in fact we are actively protected from these dangers, influenced by
the events of September 11, 2001.
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